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INTRODUCTION
A government employer, unlike its private-sector counterpart,
must operate within the confines of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 While a private-sector employer can typically
discipline or discharge an employee as determined by its business
judgment,2 Title 42 § 1983 of the United States Code3 imposes liability
*

J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. cum laude, May 1999, Clark University. Tracy F. Mendonides
dedicates this Comment to Fumi M. Farrell and Konstandina Mendonides.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 442 (1958) (“Unless otherwise
agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and serve create
obligations to employ and serve which are terminable by either party”); see
generally Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a
Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 687 (2000).
3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
383-84 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (even if an government employee is
“merely a probationary employee, and even if [the employee] could have been
discharged for any reason, or for no reason at all, [the employee] may
nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising
her constitutional right to freedom of expression”).
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on any government actor that disciplines or discharges a government
employee in violation of the employee’s protected right to speech and
association.4 This creates a unique tension in the government
employment context between an employee’s right as a citizen to be
free from governmental intrusion on personal liberties, and the
government’s legitimate interest as an employer in limiting disruptive
speech.5
More than thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court rejected the
idea that citizens working for government agencies forfeit the ability
to publicly criticize their employers.6 Therefore, if a public employee
is speaking as a citizen and on a matter of public concern, a
government employer may only restrict the speech as necessary to
pursue its legitimate interest in operational efficiency.7 The Supreme
4

The essential elements of a § 1983 claim are: 1) deprivation of a right secured
by the constitution or laws of the United States 2) caused by an action taken under
color of state law. Hernandez v. City of Goshen, Indiana, 324 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
Government actors may be sued in their individual, as well as their official
capacities under § 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
5
See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (noting the “dual role of the public employer as a
provider of public services and as a government entity operating under the
constraints of the First Amendment”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1966
(2006) (Souter, J. dissenting) (noting “the tension between individual and public
interests in the speech, on the one hand, and the government’s interest in operating
efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing
employees”).
6
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385
U.S. 589, 606 (1967)) (“’[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has
been uniformly rejected’”).
7
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1958 (“So long as employees are speaking as citizens
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that
are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively”). Because
these are post hoc employment decisions, and not content-based restrictions on a
specific category of speech, they are not subject to strict scrutiny. See United States
v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995). Rather, a court
need only determine whether the employer had a legitimate reason to discipline or
discharge the employee based on the speech. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
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Court recently refined this standard in Garcetti v. Ceballos,8 holding
that a government employee speaking pursuant to an official duty is
precluded from claiming First Amendment protection for speech “as a
citizen.”9
Although the Seventh Circuit was the first United States Court of
Appeals to apply this distinction, Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judges
Williams and Rovner seemingly ignored the analytical guidelines
expressed in Garcetti,10 as well as decades of Supreme Court
precedent,11 and applied a truncated analysis to determine whether an
employee was speaking “pursuant to [her] official duties”12 in Mills v.
City of Evansville.13 If Mills is interpreted broadly, its holding unduly
limits the circumstances under which a government employee can
claim protection for speech propounded at the workplace and creates a
disincentive for employee’s to report internal wrongdoing through the
chain of command.
This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Mills suggests an overly broad application of the standard announced
in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Section I will recount Supreme Court
precedent relating to the speech rights of government employees,
including its recent decision in Garcetti. Section II will discuss the
Seventh Circuit’s application of Garcetti in Mills. Section III will
contrast the Seventh Circuit’s analysis with the application of Garcetti
by other United States Courts of Appeals. Section IV will explore the
repercussions of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mills for
government employers and employees in the Seventh Circuit.

8

126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
Id. at 1955.
10
Id. at 1959-61.
11
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County,
Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
12
Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir.
2006).
13
Id. at 646-48.
9
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH
JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to 1967, the “unchallenged dogma”14 was that a government
employer could condition employment on whatever terms it saw fit,
including those that limited an employee’s freedom of speech and
association, without fear of being held to have violated the
Constitution.15 Although this line of reasoning was eventually
rejected,16 First Amendment protection for statements by government
employees has emerged slowly, and protection for statements in the
government employment context has been the exception, not the rule.
A. Emergence from At-Will Employment Doctrine
In the absence of an employment contract to the contrary,
employment relationships in the United States are presumed to be atwill.17 Under this doctrine, either the employer or employee may
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason, or

14

Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892)) (“[A policeman] may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman”). (internal citations omitted).
15
See Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled by
385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United
Pub. Works v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); U.S. v. Wurzbach 289 U.S. 396 (1930);
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
16
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
17
See generally James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-will
Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 235, 235 n.2 (citing Peter O.
Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. LAW (Matther Bender) §
259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. Law § 259.04).
(“[e]mployment is presumed to be at will in . . . every state” except Montana).
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for no reason at all. 18 Although courts and legislatures have created
exceptions to the at-will presumption,19 it nonetheless gives employers
in the private-sector broad discretion to terminate their employees for
any reason, including their speech,20 so long as the termination is not
in violation of a contract or statute.21 While the at-will employment
doctrine creates the illusion of equivalence, it has been criticized for
creating a “vast disparity in power between employers and their

18

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 442 (1958); see generally Deborah
A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS.
L.J. 653, 687 (2000).
19
Courts have applied implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing,
implied contracts of continued employment. In addition, public policy exceptions
prevent an employer from terminating an employee for certain protected activities,
which have included: whistleblowing, exercising a statutory or constitutional right,
refusing to commit an illegal act, and performance of a statutory duty. See generally
Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines: Will
Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (Spring 2004); Deborah
A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS.
L.J. 653, 687 (Summer 2000); Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Jonathan J. Darrow,
Employment Termination For Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for
2005 and Beyond, or A Recipe For Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, *7
(Fall 2006).
For statutory exceptions including state and federal whistleblower statutes see
generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. L. (Matthew
Bender) § 259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. Law §
259.04.
For whistleblower statutes in states in the Seventh Circuit see 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 415/19 c.1 (West 2007); IND. CODE 36-1-8-8 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. §
230.80 (West 2007).
20
See Chris Oakes, 23 Fired for Email Violations, WIRED MAGAZINE,
December 1, 1999, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/12/32820 (last visited May 2, 2007);
Fired for Sending E-mail: More Employers are Reading E-mails, to Employees
Surprise, CBS Early Show (2004)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/17/earlyshow/living/caught/main636589.s
html (last visited May 2, 2007).
21
See generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP.
L. (Matthew Bender) § 259.04 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp.
Law § 259.04.
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employees”22 by giving employers the ability to leverage the
employment relationship to pressure employees to act or refrain from
acting in ways frowned upon by the employer.23
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of the State of New York24 in 1967, courts justified a variety of
restrictions on speech and association in the employment context by
borrowing from the underlying theory of at-will employment
doctrine—that an employee has no legally cognizable right to be
employed.25 Accordingly, a public employer could terminate an
employee for “the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or
words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act,”26 for belonging
to a group deemed “subversive,”27 or for simply “advocat[ing]”
subversive ideas.28 Courts reasoned that such restrictions on
government employment did not chill freedom of speech or
association because employees maintained the option of “retain[ing]
their beliefs and associations and go[ing] elsewhere.”29 Therefore, the
personal liberties of an employee forced to choose between
government employment and his personal beliefs were limited only “in
the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice.”30
22

Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines:
Will Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (Spring 2004). See
also Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Jonathan J. Darrow, Employment Termination For
Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or A Recipe For
Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, *7 (Fall 2006).
23
Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines:
Will Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (2004).
24
385 U.S. 589 (1967)
25
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (quoting Justice Holmes in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892)) (“[A policeman] may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman”). (internal citations omitted).
26
Adler, 342 U.S. at 489 n.5.
27
Id. at 489 n.4.
28
Id. at 489 nn.3, 4.
29
Id. at 492.
30
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
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B. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York:
The Supreme Court Recognizes the Rights of Government Employees
as Citizens
By 1967, the courts of the nation had “uniformly rejected” the
premise that personal liberties were not infringed by denying or
placing conditions on government employment.31 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court announced a new standard, holding that a government
employer cannot “condition[ ] employment upon the surrender of
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government
action.”32
In Keyishian, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional a New
York statute that refused employment to applicants associated with
organizations deemed “subversive.”33 And, although the facts of that
case arose in the refusal-to-hire context, the Court strongly suggested
that it would also recognize First Amendment violations for wrongful
terminations.34 A year later, the Court confirmed that notion in
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205,
Will County, Illinois.35
C. Pickering and its Progeny:
Balancing the Interests of Government Employer and Employee
In a holding that changed the legal landscape for both government
employers and employees, the Supreme Court recognized “it is
essential that [public employees] be able to speak out freely on
[matters of public concern] without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”36
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 605-10.
34
Id. at 607, n.11 (“there can be no doubt that the repressive impact of
discharge will be no less direct or substantial”).
35
391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
36
Id.
32
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Keyishian held that a government employer cannot refuse employment
on a basis that infringes a citizen’s freedom of speech or association.37
The Pickering majority took that reasoning one step further by holding
that a citizen who has entered into an employment relationship with
the government does not relinquish his First Amendment rights as a
condition of employment.38 Therefore, government employees cannot
constitutionally be discharged for publicly criticizing their
employers.39
Pickering recognized a retaliatory discharge claim by a public
high school teacher who alleged he was terminated for writing a letter
to the local newspaper that criticized a tax-increase proposal supported
by the Board and the Superintendent of Schools.40 In his letter, Marvin
L. Pickering accused the Board of channeling taxpayer funds towards
athletics rather than to the programs and improvements that the Board
had previously promised41 and accused the Superintendent of
attempting to curb employee speech on the issue by threatening to
impose discipline on teachers that openly opposed the new proposal.42
The reasoning in Pickering was twofold. In addition to vindicating
the First Amendment rights of public employees as citizens, the
Pickering majority also recognized the value of employee speech to
the “free marketplace of ideas”43 protected by First Amendment
jurisprudence, noting that government employees are often in a unique
position to comment upon the efficient operation of their employers,
and therefore, have valuable insight that should be made available to
the community.44 As a result, allowing government employers to
37

Id. at 568.
Id.
39
See id. at 574 (“a[n] [employee’s] exercise of his right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from pubic
employment”).
40
Id. at 565-66.
41
Id. at 575-78 app. A.
42
Id. at 576 app. A.
43
See generally Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
44
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
38
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punish any employee speech that is critical or deemed “detrimental to
the best interests” of the employer could have the effect of depriving
the public of information needed to make well-informed decisions.45
At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged the
competing interest of “the State . . . as an employer in regulating [the]
speech [of its employees].”46 Therefore, Pickering holds that courts are
charged with the responsibility of determining “a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”47
Under Pickering, the initial stage of analysis requires a court to
determine whether the employee’s statements were made “as a citizen .
. . upon matters of public concern.”48 If they were, then the statements
are protected.49 Nonetheless a government employer may
constitutionally discipline or discharge an employee even for protected
statements if it can show its interests as an employer “in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs” outweigh “the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in [making the statements]” under the
second, balancing stage of Pickering analysis.50
While the Supreme Court recognized the “enormous variety of
fact situations” that may lead to First Amendment claims under
Pickering and declined to lay down a bright-line rule for determining
legitimate government interests in regulating employee speech,51 it
suggested that relevant considerations under the second-stage of
analysis include: whether the statement interferes with the employer’s
ability to maintain discipline or harmony among its workers, whether
it has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id. at 568.
48
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
49
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 569
46
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“personal loyalty and confidence” are reasonably required, or whether
the statement impedes the performance of the employee’s daily duties
or interferes with the regular operation of the employer.52 The Court
further suggested that the government may have greater, even
absolute, ability to control the speech of high-level employees,
depending on the nature of their position.53
Pickering was a victory for government employees wishing to
engage in civic discussion publicly. Yet even though the holding
clearly protected speech propounded to the public, the opinion left
open the issue of what types of statements could form the basis for
viable First Amendment retaliation claims beyond those made in a
public forum.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court resolved any doubts regarding
whether First Amendment protection for government employees
extended only to statements made to the public.54 In Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District, the Court held that First
Amendment protection extends both to statements made to the public
as well as to statements at the workplace.55 As such, a school teacher’s
private complaints to the school principal about what she perceived to
be discriminatory employment practices were held to constitute
protected speech.56

52

Id. at 570-73 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52
(1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
53
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (1983)
(again noting, “when close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is
appropriate”).
54
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 414; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386-88 (holding First Amendment
protection extended to private statements made by an employee to a co-worker
regarding the attempted assassination of then President, Ronald Reagan. Therefore,
the plaintiff-employee’s statement could not form the basis for discharge absent a
showing that the statement interfered with the “efficient functioning of the office”).
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D. The Modern Standard:
Striking the Balance in Favor of the Employer
Despite the protection offered to public employees by Pickering
and Givhan, the Supreme Court has recognized that not all employee
speech relating to the internal operations of a government employer is
protected by the First Amendment as a “matter of public concern.”57
Although “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special
protection,”58 Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a government
employer is, nonetheless, an employer, and as such retains broad
discretion to discipline an employee where the employee is not
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.59
1. Connick v. Myers
By 1983, it was well-established that the rights of government
employees could not be abridged as a condition of employment.60 But,
the Supreme Court also recognized that “government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.”61 Therefore, the Supreme Court in Connick held:

57

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983).
Id. at 145 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982)).
59
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (when employee expression “cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices”); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (“public employers are employers, concerned with
the efficient function of their operations; review of every personnel decision made by
a public employer could, in the long run, hamper the performance of public
functions”).
60
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
61
Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
58
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[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee’s behavior.62
Connick excludes statements that are essentially an employee’s
personal grievances from protection as “matters of public concern.”63
By doing so, the Court maintained protection of employee speech on
matters of value to the public while at the same time protecting the
government from employees seeking to “constitutionalize the
employee grievance” by turning any adverse employment decision
into a constitutional claim by asserting that their grievances address
matters of public concern.64
Sheila Myers, the plaintiff in Connick, was an Assistant District
Attorney who vocally opposed her proposed transfer to another
department.65 She was discharged after distributing a questionnaire to
her co-workers that created what was described by Myers’ supervisor
as, a “mini-insurrection” within the office.66 Among other things, the
questionnaire asked co-workers whether they believed the office
procedure regarding transfers was fair, whether they thought there was
an active “rumor mill” in the office, and whether they had confidence
in and would rely on the work of five individually named
supervisors.67
Myers argued that the questionnaire was protected under the First
Amendment because it addressed matters of public concern.68
62

Id. at 147 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976)).
Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
64
Id. at 154.
65
Id. at 140-41.
66
Id. at 140.
67
Id. at 257 app. A.
68
Id. at 141.
63
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However, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that any matter relating
the internal operations of a government employer—down to office
procedure regarding transfers, and whether individual employees have
confidence in their supervisors—is a matter of public concern simply
because it may tangentially relate to governmental efficiency.69
The Court held whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter
of public concern is a fact-intensive inquiry to be determined by the
“content, form and context” of the statement “as revealed by the whole
record.”70 And, an issue such as employee confidence in supervisors,
that is “not otherwise of public concern” does not rise to that level
simply because “its subject matter . . . might be of general interest” if
communicated to the public.71
In addition to limiting what constitutes a matter of public concern
Connick gave further judicial deference to the business judgment of
government employers by suggesting that the government has broad
discretion to discipline its employees contemporaneously based on the
predicted results of the speech.72 Moreover, the Court rejected Myers’
assertion that the government was required to justify her termination
by showing that the questionnaire “substantially interfered” with the
operations of the office.73 Rather, the state’s burden in justifying a

69

Id. at 149 (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional
case”).
70
Id. at 147-48.
71
Id. at 148 n.8. However, the Court ultimately held that Myers’ question
regarding whether employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns was a
matter of public concern; therefore, Pickering balancing was required. Id. at 149.
72
Id. (a government employer is not required to “allow events to unfold to the
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action”). But, importantly, the Court cautioned that a
“stronger showing” of disruption or potential disruption may be required where the
employee’s speech “more substantially involved matters of public concern [than
Myers’ questionnaire].” Id.
73
Id. at 149.
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particular discharge will vary depending on the nature of the
employee’s expression.74
2. Post-Connick decisions
After Connick, the United States Courts of Appeals applied
various methods of analysis to determine whether a government
employee was speaking “as a citizen upon matters of public concern
[or] instead as an employee upon matters of personal interest.”75 Many
circuits held that whether an employee was speaking as a citizen on a
matter of public concern was intent-based.76 In those circuits, the
question was: Was the employee speaking primarily as a concerned
citizen, or as an employee merely interested in internal procedure?77
Under this method of analysis, if an employee was motivated by a
personal grievance, the speech was precluded from protection as a
matter of public concern.78
The Seventh Circuit held that intent was a factor, but not the most
important factor.79 In the Seventh Circuit, whether the speech
constituted a matter of public concern was determined by the “content,
form, and context” of the given statement, with content being the most
important factor.80 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the idea that
speech on a matter of public concern lost its protected status if it was
expounded only for personal reasons, rather than a desire to “air the

74

Id. at 150.
Id. at 147.
76
See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1993);
David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1356 (10th Cir. 1996); Morgan v. Ford, 6
F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993).
77
See Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754.
78
See Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d 134 at 143; David, 101 F.3d at 1356; Morgan, 6 F.3d
at 755.
79
Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492 (7th Cir.
1994).
80
Id.
75
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merits of the issue.”81 Accordingly, if the content of the speech
addressed a matter of public concern, the speech was protected,
irrespective of the employee’s motive for engaging in the speech.82
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos
In 2006, the Supreme Court clarified the Pickering/Connick test
but imposed an additional hurdle upon government employees by
bifurcating the initial stage of analysis.83 Under Garcetti, an employee
must be speaking both as a citizen and on a matter of public concern
before reaching the balancing stage of Pickering.84 Therefore, if a
public employee cannot establish that he was speaking as a citizen,
and not as an employee “pursuant to . . . official duties”85 the
government is free to punish the speech at its discretion, and courts
will not examine the government interest in regulating the speech,
even if the speech addresses a matter of public concern.86
Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in Garcetti, was an Assistant
District Attorney who claimed his First Amendment rights were
violated when he suffered a series of allegedly adverse employment
actions stemming from a disposition memorandum he wrote to his
supervisor detailing what he believed were serious misrepresentations
81

Wainscott v. Henry, 315 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Animosity in a
supervisor-subordinate relationship cannot be the sole basis for characterizing an
unflattering statement as a personal grievance” and thereby excluding the statement
from protection); Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 1994) (“the content of
some remarks may life the speech to the level of public concern even if the
employee’s reasons for speaking out are entirely self-interested”).
82
Wainscott, 315 F.3d at 850; Smith, 28 F.3d at 652.
83
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
84
Id. at 1961 (“When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of
public concern, they First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the
employee is simply performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar
degree of scrutiny”).
85
Id. at 1960.
86
Id. at 1961.
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in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a pending case.87
Ceballos was alerted to the potential inaccuracies in early 2000 by a
defense lawyer.88 Based on a personal investigation, Ceballos believed
that the warrant affiant, a deputy sheriff, “at least grossly
misrepresented the facts.”89
Following a meeting with his immediate supervisor and the Head
Deputy District Attorney regarding the inaccuracies, Ceballos
completed a disposition memo in which he detailed the inconsistencies
and recommended that the pending case be dismissed.90 Ceballos’
supervisor directed him to revise the memo to make it “less
accusatory” of the warrant affiant.91 After Ceballos wrote a second
disposition memo again recommending that the case be dismissed, he
was “sharply criticiz[ed]” for his handling of the case during a meeting
with his superiors.92 Following his supervisor’s decision to proceed
with the case, Ceballos alleged that he was subject to a series of
retaliatory employment actions including reassignment from his
calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another
courthouse, and denial of a promotion.93 The Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment did not protect Ceballos from discipline for his
statements in the disposition because those statements were made
“pursuant to [his] official duties” and, therefore, could be controlled at
his employer’s discretion.
Garcetti holds that speech espoused by a public employee
pursuant to an employment duty is precluded from protection as
speech “as a citizen,” even if the employee was motivated by his

87

Id. at 1955-56.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by 126
S. Ct. at 1960.
89
Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1956.
93
Id.
88
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concerns as a citizen.94 Where an employee is speaking pursuant to his
official duties, he is not speaking as a citizen, and his speech does not
rise to that level by virtue of its subject matter, or his intent in
forwarding the statement.95
In justifying this limit, the Court reasoned that “[r]estricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might
have enjoyed as a private citizen. Rather, it simply reflects the exercise
of employer control over what the employer has itself commissioned
or created.”96
Garcetti made clear that statements by government employees are
not automatically precluded from First Amendment protection simply
because they are made at the workplace, or because they concern the
subject-matter of employment.97 The Supreme Court also rejected the
idea “that employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating
excessively broad job descriptions.”98 But outside of these very
general guidelines, the Supreme Court did not specify a method of
analysis for determining when statements are made “pursuant to [an
employee’s] official duties” other than holding that the “proper inquiry
is a practical one” into the “scope of the employee’s professional
duties.”99 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit seems to have ignored even
these limited guidelines in Mills v. City of Evansville.100
94

See id. at 126 S.Ct. at 1960 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because
that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do. It is immaterial
whether he experienced some personal gratification from writing the memo; his First
Amendment rights do not depend on his job satisfaction”).
95
See id. at 126 S.Ct. at 1956-57 (In holding that an employee must be
speaking both as a citizen, and on a matter of public concern, the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that because the content of the disposition
memo, was “inherently . . . of public concern” and not of personal interest, Ceballos’
memo was protectable as speech “as a citizen”).
96
Id. at 1960.
97
Id. at 1959.
98
Id. at 1961.
99
Id. at 1962.
100
(“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 646-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
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II. MILLS V. CITY OF EVANSVILLE
Mills was decided approximately three weeks after Garcetti
issued,101 making the Seventh Circuit the first United States Court of
Appeals to apply the Supreme Court decision to determine when an
employee’s statements are made “pursuant to [an] official duty.” But
rather than defining a method of analysis, Judges Easterbrook,
Williams, and Rovner ignored Garcetti’s guidelines by failing to
address the scope of Mills’ job responsibilities and instead summarily
held that the Brenda Mills’ statements were precluded from First
Amendment protection without articulating a reasoned basis for their
decision.102
The Seventh Circuit’s truncated analysis is flawed for three
reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit unnecessarily extended Garcetti
beyond the internal document scenario addressed in that case. Second,
even assuming the Seventh Circuit was justified in extending Garcetti,
the Court ignored the analytical guidelines articulated by the Supreme
Court and failed to provide a reasoned basis for that extension. Third,
by extending Garcetti without identifying the facts on which it based
its decision, the Seventh Circuit suggested a confusingly broad rule
that is unduly restrictive and benefits neither government employees
nor their employers.
A. Facts of the Case
Brenda Mills worked as a police officer for the City of Evansville,
Indiana for twenty-seven years.103 For the last six years of her
employment, her duties included supervising the “Crime Prevention
101

Id. at 646.
See id. at 648 (Judge Easterbrook dedicates only one paragraph of a one and
a half page opinion to the issue of whether Brenda Mills was speaking pursuant to
her official duties).
103
Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills I”), No. 3:03CV00183-JDT-WGH,
2005 WL 1939917, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 28,2005), overruled by 452 F.3d 646, 64648 (7th Cir. 2006).
102
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Officers” assigned throughout the City’s West Sector. 104 In Mills’
words, these officers were: “part of the patrol division . . . assigned
throughout the city to, in part, interact with neighborhood associations
in an effort to reduce the incidence of crime, foster good community
relationships and deal with quality of life issues.”105
Sometime prior to January 2002, the Evansville Chief of Police
proposed a re-structuring plan aimed at dealing with a manpower
shortage within the city’s Police Department that would reduce the
number of Crime Prevention Officers on Mills’ shift by one.106 The
Chief formally announced his plan at a meeting of upper level staff
members on January 18, 2002, which Mills attended in lieu of her
supervisor.107 The meeting was on departmental premises, and Mills
was on-duty and in uniform both during and after the meeting.108
After the meeting ended, the Chief approached Mills and initiated
a conversation in the public lobby of the Police Station.109 The Chief
informed Mills that he was concerned because he had heard that some
of the Crime Prevention Officers had attended a neighborhood meeting
where they informed neighborhood association members that they
could contact the Mayor in order to prevent the removal of the Crime
Prevention Officer on Mills’ shift.110 Other of Mills’ superiors were
present during the conversation, although whether the conversation
could be overheard by others passing through the lobby area was
disputed.111 During the conversation, Mills expressed her opinion to
104
105

Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1.
Id.; Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir.

2006).
106

Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647.
Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1.
108
Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647.
109
Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1. According to Mills, the Chief approached
her and said, “If the [Crime Prevention Officers] want a problem, they can have it.”
Br. of Pl.-Appellant at *5, Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., No. 05-3207 (7th Cir.
Oct. 31, 2005).
110
Mills II at *1.
111
Br. of Pl.-Appellant at *7, Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., No. 05-3207
(7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005).
107
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the Chief and the other superior officers present “that the plan would
not work, that community organizations would not let the change
happen, and that sooner or later [the Chief] would have to restore the
old personnel assignment policies.”112
Twelve days after Mills made the statements in the lobby, Captain
Brad Hill, who had joined the January 18th conversation between
Mills and her superiors at some point in the middle, put a “Summary
of Counseling” in Mills’ file that “disapproved [of] her attitude at the
meeting, her choice of time and place for presenting her views, and her
failure to work through the chain of command.” 113 Mills agreed in her
response to the Summary that the time and place were inappropriate,
but indicated she felt she was left “with no recourse except to respond”
because the Chief continued to press her to state her opinion.114
Shortly over a month after the “Summary of Counseling” was put
in Mills’ file, Mills was removed from her supervisory position on the
first shift and transferred to patrol duties on the West Sector third
shift.115 About six weeks later, on April 24, 2002, Mills was informed
that she was going to be transferred again—this time, to patrol duties
on the South Sector.116 After Mills objected to the re-assignment, she
was transferred to the Record Room.117
Mills subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the
City of Evansville and certain officers in their individual capacities
violated the United States Constitution by unlawfully retaliating
against her because of her speech.118 The Southern District of Indiana
granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that although
Mills’ statements after the meeting were protected, the police
department’s “interest in efficient management of its operations”

112

Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647.
Id.; Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *2.
114
Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *2.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647.
113
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outweighed her First Amendment interests in the speech.119 Mills then
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
In a one paragraph rationale, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that Mills’ statements were not protected under
Garcetti because:
Mills was on duty, in uniform, and engaged in
discussion with her superiors, all of whom had just
emerged from [the] Chief[’s] briefing. She spoke in her
capacity as a public employee contributing to the
formation and execution of official policy. Under
Garcetti her employer could draw inferences from her
statements about whether she would not zealously
implement the Chief’s plans or try to undermine them;
when the department drew the latter inference it was
free to act accordingly.120
B. Mills unnecessarily extends Garcetti.
Although the Seventh Circuit likely reached the right result, it
seemingly did so for the wrong reasons. Mills improperly implies that
all job-related statements are precluded from First Amendment
protection under Garcetti. But, Garcetti’s holding is not so broad.
Specifically, insofar as Mills implies that Brenda Mills was speaking
pursuant to her official duties because her speech was propounded at
the workplace and pertains to the subject matter of her employment:
that reasoning was specifically rejected by Garcetti.121 Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit could have reached the same result by either
articulating a factual basis for holding that Mills was speaking
pursuant to an employment duty, or by holding that her employer’s
interest in maintaining the chain of command outweighed her First

119

Id.
Id. at 648.
121
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959 (2006).
120
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Amendment interest in forwarding statements that were critical of the
Chief of Police.
1. Garcetti should be limited to internal communications that can be
properly characterized as the employer’s speech.
The facts and reasoning of the Garcetti opinion support a narrow
reading that limits its holding to internal documents and other speech
compelled by an employment duty. Underlying the Garcetti opinion is
deference to the idea that government employers, “like private
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’
words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the
efficient provision of public services.”122 But although the Supreme
Court clearly intended to preclude government employees from stating
First Amendment retaliation claims for statements properly
encompassed within their official duties, the Court nonetheless implied
limits on its holding.
First, Garcetti was a fact-specific case that dealt with a disposition
memo Ceballos was unquestionably required to write. In determining
that Ceballos’ disposition memo was written “pursuant to [his]
employment duties,”123 the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that
Ceballos had an employment duty to write the memo. The Court
explained that he was speaking “as a prosecutor fulfilling a
responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with
a pending case”;124 that “[he] wrote his disposition memo because that
is part of what he, as a calendar deputy was employed to do”;125 that
the memo “owe[d] its existence” to his “professional
responsibilities”;126 and Ceballos was “simply performing his . . . job
122

Id. at 1958. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning continues to support the idea
that “managerial discretion” should not be “displace[d] . . . by judicial supervision.”
Id. at 1961.
123
Id. at 1957.
124
Id. at 1959.
125
Id. at 1960.
126
Id.
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duties.”127 The Court also referred to the disposition memo as “work
product.”128 Thus:
Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about
conducting his daily professional activities, such as
supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and
preparing filings. In the same way he did not speak as a
citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper
disposition of a pending criminal case. When he went to
work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform,
Ceballos acted as a government employee.129
In contrast, Mills’ statements are not as clearly encompassed in
her job responsibilities as the disposition memo in Garcetti. Mills
made statements after the meeting she was required to attend had
ended. 130 And although the Seventh Circuit noted that she was “on
duty, in uniform, and engaged in discussion with her superiors,”131
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion fails to indicate why these facts establish,
as a matter of law, that Mills was speaking pursuant to her official
duties.
Second, the reasoning of Garcetti does not support a broad
application. Garcetti reflects the ability of the government employer to
control speech, like Ceballos’ disposition memo, that is cloaked as the
speech of the employer.132 Such restrictions on documents “under the
control, and vested with the authority, of [the] employer”133 do not
127

Id. at 1961.
Id. at 1960.
129
Id.
130
Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir.
2006).
131
Id. at 648.
132
See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct at 1960 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” simply reflects the ability of the
employer to “control . . . what the employer has itself commissioned or created”).
133
Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 842 (11th Cir.
2000)
128
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violate the First Amendment because this type of speech is not
properly categorized as employee speech at all.134 Accordingly, there is
no “relevant analogue”135 to speech by citizens who are not
government employees, and a government employer may limit and
control such statements at its discretion.136
And, on an intuitive level, this type of limited application of
Garcetti does not elicit the same kind of negative gut-reaction as a
broader application because it makes sense that the government should
be given discretion to control its own speech. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit has employed similar reasoning in justifying limits on public
school teachers’ speech in the classroom because “the school system
does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech.”137
Moreover, while Garcetti recognizes the broad discretion of the
government employer to control its “official communications,”138
nothing in Garcetti suggests that the Supreme Court intended to
overrule Givhan by applying an overly broad interpretation of “official
duties.” Indeed, Garcetti cites Givhan as good law.139
Lastly, it should be noted that the Court never questioned the
ability of Pickering balancing to protect a government employer’s
legitimate interest in disciplining and discharging employees for
speech that interferes with the efficiency of governmental
operations.140 Because the second stage of Pickering analysis already
134

Id.
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1961.
136
Id.
137
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir.
2007). For a comprehensive discussion of the speech rights of public school teachers
in light of Mayer v. Monroe see Justin Nemunaitis, Mayer v. Monroe: The Seventh
Circuit Sheds Freedom of Speech at the Classroom Door, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV.
762 (2007), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-2/nemunaitis.pdf.
138
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960.
139
Id. at 1959.
140
This is particularly true in the Seventh Circuit, which already interprets an
“adverse employment action” narrowly for purposes of First Amendment retaliation
claims. See Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th
Cir. 2006).
135
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adequately protects a government employer’s ability to limit speech
that jeopardizes operational efficiency, there is no reason to apply a
broad interpretation of Garcetti that precludes all job-related
statements from protection. In addition, allowing protection for
statements under the first stage of Pickering while recognizing greater
latitude for government employee discipline under the second stage
would comport more with First Amendment jurisprudence, which
recognizes that personal liberties should be narrowly proscribed.141
2. Limiting Garcetti comports with Seventh Circuit precedent.
The Seventh Circuit has addressed First Amendment retaliation
claims by employees for statements made pursuant to employment
responsibilities prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti.142 In
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, a Chicago police officer claimed he was
retaliated against by the City of Chicago, its Chief of Police, and two
supervisors in the city’s 18th District for investigative reports he
completed on at least nine 18th District Officers during his previous
employment as a civilian employee of the Chicago Police
Department’s Office of Professional Standards.143
The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants holding that Gonzalez could not, as a matter of law,
establish he was speaking “as a citizen” under Connick inasmuch as
his statements were “written statements for internal use in the
Department,”144 “required by his employer,”145 and the statements

141

See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (“even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved”); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)
(“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity”).
142
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 939-43 (7th Cir. 2001).
143
Id. at 940.
144
Id. at 941.
145
Id.
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were “created in the scope of [his] ordinary job responsibilities.”146
Judges Ripple, Manion, and Kanne reasoned that although the
investigations of police misconduct addressed a matter of public
concern, Gonzalez was precluded from claiming First Amendment
protection because the investigative reports were a “routine
requirement of the job” and, as such, Gonzalez was “clearly acting
entirely in an employment capacity [and not as a citizen] when he
made those reports.”147 The judges further noted that the written
reports were “mandated”148 by Gonzalez’s employment
responsibilities, and failure to write the reports would be a “dereliction
of employment duties” for which Gonzalez could have been fired.149
In 2002, the Seventh Circuit reinforced the distinction between
routine and discretionary duties for purposes of determining whether
an employee is speaking as a citizen in Delgado v. Jones.150 That case
involved a 15-year veteran of the Milwaukee Police Department who
claimed he was retaliated against after reporting to his supervising
lieutenant that he may have information about public school
employees buying and selling drugs, and that he had an informant who
claimed that a close relative of a public official had been frequenting a
drug house.151 Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Wood held that the
officer’s statements were not per se precluded from protection under
Gonzalez, distinguishing between “routine” statements of the type
made in Gonzalez and “discretionary” statements, which maintain
some prospect of protection.152 The panel reasoned that although
“divulging [the] information to his superiors may have been consistent
with his obligations as a police officer in seeking an independent and
objective investigation,” the officer nonetheless maintained
“considerable discretion about how he communicated the information
146

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 942.
150
Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
151
Id. at 514.
152
Id.
147
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up the chain of command,” such that the statements “went beyond
some rote, routine discharge of an assigned duty as in Gonzalez.”153
While the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Spiegla v. Hull
seemingly dispenses with the routine/discretionary distinction, at least
in the context of internal whistleblowing within a chain of
command,154 the reasoning of Spiegla case is not inconsistent with a
limited application of Garcetti to speech compelled or “mandated” by
an employment duty as in Gonzalez.
In Spiegla, the “speech” at issue included Spiegla’s entries in her
employer’s log book, and her internal reports to supervisors within her
chain of command regarding the suspicious activities of two coworkers.155 Those entries and reports were made after Spiegla
observed the suspicious activities of two fellow prison guards in the
course of her assignment to monitor the front door of the prison where
she was employed.156 Accordingly, Spiegla is distinguishable from
Mills because even if internal whistleblowing was not encompassed
within Spiegla’s “core duties,” she nonetheless had an affirmative
employment duty to report the alleged infractions, and the speech at
issue—particularly her entries in the log book—could properly be
characterized as the employer’s speech.
3. The Seventh Circuit Could Have Reached the Same Result Without
Stripping Mills’ Speech of First Amendment Protection.
The Seventh Circuit could have relied on the second stage of
Pickering analysis to justify the City of Evansville’s employment
decisions. The court could have held, as the district court did, that the
speech at issue was protected, but that the Evansville Police
Department’s interest in promoting official policy and preventing
153

Id. at 519.
Spiegla v. Hull, No. 05-3722, 2007 WL 937081, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 30,
2007) (holding that “[the] focus on ‘core’ job functions is too narrow after
Garcetti”).
155
Id. at *2.
156
Id. at *1.
154
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disruption outweighed her interest in the speech. Because of the time
and place in which Mills forwarded her speech, and because Mills
voiced her opinion to superior officers out of her chain of command,
Pickering balancing would favor the City of Evansville and, therefore,
the court could have reached the same result without stripping Mills’
statements of First Amendment protection.
Alternately, given that Judge Easterbrook devotes the majority of
the opinion to a discussion of why Mills’ “lateral transfer” was not an
adverse employment action for purposes of a First Amendment
retaliation claim,157 the three-judge panel could have employed the
same reasoning to hold that Mills’ statements were protected, but that
Mills failed to state a retaliation claim because she had not established
that she suffered an adverse employment action.
C. The Seventh Circuit improperly ignored the Supreme Court’s
analytical guidelines.
The Garcetti majority defined the “pursuant to official duty”
inquiry as a “practical” inquiry into the scope of the employee’s
professional duties.158 And, the Court specifically rejected the
suggestion that “employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating
excessively broad job descriptions.”159 However, the Seventh Circuit
never considered what Mills’ job responsibilities actually consisted of,
or whether attending the Chief’s meeting and supporting the Chief’s
re-structuring proposal were a legitimate part of her job
responsibilities such that she was speaking “pursuant to official duty”
157

The Seventh Circuit employs a three-stage burden-shifting analysis for First
Amendment retaliation claims under § 1983: 1) the employee must establish that he
engaged in constitutionally protected speech 2) the speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in an adverse employment action taken against the employee 3)
once the employee establishes the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the
government defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
action would have been taken irrespective of the protected speech. Kuchenreuther v.
City of Milwaukee, 221 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2000).
158
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006).
159
Id.
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when she commented on the Chief’s proposal after the meeting.160
Moreover, the court did not address whether Mills was the type of
high-ranking employee such that “political loyalty [is considered] a
valid qualification” and the employee can be disciplined for failure to
promote official policy.161 Instead, the Seventh Circuit merely
concluded without explanation that Mills was speaking pursuant to her
official duties because she was “speaking in her capacity as a public
employee contributing to the formation and execution of official
policy.”162
Because the Seventh Circuit never examined what Mills’ job
description actually entailed, its reasoning could be interpreted broadly
as holding that any employee statement that tangentially relates to the
internal operations of a government employer is subsumed within an
employee’s “official duties” under Garcetti.163 The related
160

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987). (In the context of
“weighing the state’s interest in discharging an employee based on any claim that the
content of the statement somehow undermines the mission of the public employer,
some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee within the
agency. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role
entails”).
161
Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2006).
162
Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.
2006).
163

It could be persuasively argued that the Seventh Circuit’s
definition goes beyond the bounds envisioned by the [Supreme]
Court. It could be argued that if the standards upon which the
Seventh Circuit based their decision had been used to assess Ardith
McPherson or Bessie Givhan’s claims, the Supreme Court would
have granted summary judgment and dismissed their claims. This
[sic] Seventh Circuit’s definition of within the “scope of employ”
is so broad that it effectively excludes the entire public employee
labor force from First Amendment protection sans a few lone
instances where some lucky soul may find safe harbor.
Kathryn v. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Dual Threshold Requirement
Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 93 (Fall 2006).
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presumption—that “all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern” 164—was expressly rejected in Connick,
and such a sweeping generalization without further analysis should be
similarly rejected in determining whether a government employee is
speaking “as a citizen.”
Even if Mills had a duty to respond to the Chief’s question, her
statements should not be precluded from First Amendment protection
simply because they are job-related. If the Chief was unhappy with the
content of Mills’ response, he was free to discipline her for
insubordination, or (as he did) for the time and manner in which she
voiced her opinions.
In addition, the three-judge panel never addressed, nor did it even
mention in its summary of facts, that the Chief of Police initiated his
conversation with Mills specifically because he had heard that several
of the Crime Prevention Officers were contacting neighborhood
groups and asking them to directly contact the mayor to criticize his
proposal.165 Therefore, there is a justifiable inference that the purpose
of the Chief’s conversation with Mills was to enlist Mills to stifle the
protected speech of her subordinate officers.166 Arguably, such tasks
were not a part of Mills official responsibilities, and Mills maintained
the prospect of First Amendment protection in responding to such a
suggestion.
But perhaps of the greatest concern is the fact that had the threejudge panel examined Mills’ job responsibilities, it likely could have
found a justified basis for holding that Mills was speaking “pursuant to
[her] official duties.” Under Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit could have
reasoned that Mills was speaking pursuant to an official duty because
164

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills I”), No. 3:03CV00183-JDT-WGH,
2005 WL 1939917, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 28,2005), overruled by 452 F.3d 646, 64648 (7th Cir. 2006).
166
Garcetti leaves unquestioned that public employees retain First Amendment
protection for statements on matters of public concern made publicly and not in the
course of their official duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).. As
such, Crime Prevention Officers were free to enlist neighborhood organizations to
oppose the Chief’s re-organization plan.
165

696
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/9

30

Mendonides: Speak No Evil? Government Employee Speech Rights in the Seventh C

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

Mills was required to attend the Chief’s meeting in lieu of her
supervisor. Yet, Judge Easterbrook curiously omitted this point from
his summary of facts.167 Had the opinion relied on this fact in its
reasoning, Mills could be justified under Garcetti on the basis that
Mills’ spoke pursuant to her official duties her attendance at the
meeting was a required job responsibility.
Alternately, the three-judge panel could have considered whether
Mills was the type of high-ranking official whose employment duties
include promoting official policy.168 If so, Mills’ job responsibilities
may have legitimately encompassed her statements after the Chief’s
meeting such that those statements were precluded from protection
under Garcetti.169
III. OTHER CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATIONS
Although Garcetti is a relatively recent opinion, the majority of
circuits have applied its holding to determine whether a government
employee spoke “pursuant to [] official duties.”170 Although many of
these circuits have cited Mills for the proposition that government
employees are not insulated from discipline for statements made
pursuant to an employment duty171 the majority of circuits have, to
167

Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1.
See Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2006).
169
Id.
170
As of May 2, 2007, every circuit but the First Circuit has applied Garcetti.
See Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006); Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,242 (3d Cir. 2006); Campbell v. Galloway, No. 06-1038,
2007 WL 1166101 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 2007); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
480 F.3d 689, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2007); Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d
357, (6th Cir. 2007); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir.
2006); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. #2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d
918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006); Casey
v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 2007); Battle
v. Bd. of Regents for the State of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 2006); Wilburn
v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140,1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
171
See Williams, 480 F.3d at 694; Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 472 F.3d
794, 799 (10th Cir. 2007); Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1149.
168
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date, limited their application of Garcetti to required job duties,
including duties to report wrongdoing.172
For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that an athletic director
employed by a public school was speaking pursuant to his official
duties when he wrote two separate memoranda173 complaining about
the office manager’s failure to provide him with information relating
to the athletic account.174 Interpreting Garcetti, the court emphasized
that the plaintiff there was “performing activities required to fulfill his
duties as a prosecutor and calendar deputy”175 and therefore reasoned
that “job-required speech is not protected.”176 Applying that reasoning,
the court held that the subject matter and context of the memoranda
supported a holding that the athletic director was speaking pursuant to
his official duties.177 The court reasoned that, although the writing the
memo may not have been “demanded of him” in the same way as the
memo in Garcetti, it was nonetheless created in the course of doing his
job.178 Specifically, the court reasoned that the subject matter of the
memoranda focused on the athletic director’s “daily operations” and
that he needed the account information in order to do his job.179
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Director of the
District’s Office of Human Rights was speaking pursuant to an official
duty where she complained that the District Office of Personnel’s
salary decisions for two job applicants was discriminatory.180 In
Wilburn v. Robinson, the court held that government employee speech
172

Hill, 455 F.3d at 230, 242; Green, 472 F.3d at 800-01; Williams, 480 F.3d
at 690-91; McGee, 471 F.3d at 921; Freitag, 468 F.3d at 546; Battle, 468 F.3d at
761; Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1142, 1150.
173
The first memorandum was sent to the school’s office manager and the
second to the school’s principal. Williams, 480 F.3d at 690-91.
174
Id. at 690-91, 694.
175
Id. at 693.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 694.
178
Id.
179
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007).
180
Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1142, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added).
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is precluded from First Amendment protection where the contested
speech “falls within the scope of the employee’s uncontested job
responsibilities.”181 Thus, the Director was speaking pursuant to an
official duty because her employment duties “easily” encompassed
“identify[ing] and eliminat[ing] discriminatory practices in
employment . . . in the District of Columbia.”182
As Wilburn illustrates, several circuits have applied Garcetti to
internal whistle-blowers who report wrongdoing up the chain of
command.183 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an
employee of a state university’s Office of Financial Aid and Veterans
Affairs was speaking pursuant to her official duties when she reported
concerns about fraudulent financial aid claims.184 Likewise, the Third
Circuit has held that the Borough Manager of the Borough of
Kutztown was speaking pursuant to an official duty when he reported
complaints of harassment to the Borough Council.185 And, the Eighth
Circuit held that a public employee was speaking pursuant to his
official duties when he reported a concern about sewage leakage.186

181

Id. at 1150; but see Battle v. Bd. of Regents of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th
Cir. 2006) (specifically rejecting the idea that Garcetti applies only to an
“employee’s everyday job functions”).
182
Id. at 1150-51 (alteration in original).
183
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 230, 242 (3d Cir. 2006);
McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. #2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 918, 921
(8th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Casey v. W. Las
Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323,1325 (10th Cir. 2007); Battle v. Bd. of
Regents of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 761-62 (11th Cir. 2006).
184
Battle, 468 F.3d at 761-62.
185
Hill, 455 F.3d at 230, 242.
186
McGee, 471 F.3d at 921; but see Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that a superior officer was
intoxicated were precluded from protection, not because the plaintiff had a duty-toreport, but because the statements were made during the course of the investigation
and were, thus, made pursuant to his official duties); Haynes v. City of Circleville,
Ohio, 474 F.3d 357, 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Police Officer’s memo
to is supervisor complaining about training cutbacks was speaking pursuant to an
official duty).
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The Ninth, Tenth, Second, and Fourth Circuits suggest that a
distinction between required and discretionary reporting187 is still
viable. In Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit held that a female prison
guard was speaking pursuant to her official duties when she filed
internal complaints of sexual harassment by inmates, but she spoke as
a citizen when she reported the same concerns outside of the
Department of Corrections to her state senator and the California
Inspector General.188 The court further held there was a factual issue as
to whether she was speaking as a citizen when contravened the chain
of command and complained to the Director of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation in the state capitol.189 Similarly, in
Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School Board, the Tenth Circuit
held that a school superintendent, who was also the CEO of the
school’s Head Start program,190 was speaking pursuant to an official
duty when she voiced concerns about the program’s compliance with
federal regulations to the School Board,191 but spoke as a citizen when
she voiced those concerns to the state’s Attorney General.192 And, in
Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck, the Second Circuit refused to decide
on summary judgment whether a Police Officer’s complaints to the
state’s Attorney General regarding racial decision-making in the
Department were encompassed in his employment duties.193
Along the same lines, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that
employee complaints about co-workers that address personal slights,
as opposed to misconduct that affects the public, are not encompassed

187

Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2002); Gonzalez v. City of
Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001). However, other circuits reject this
distinction. Cf. Battle, 468 F.3d at 761 (specifically rejecting the idea that Garcetti
applies only to an “employee’s everyday job functions”).
188
468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006).
189
Id.
190
473 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 2007).
191
Id. at 1330.
192
Id. at 1332-33.
193
465 F.3d 96, 102, 106 (4th Cir. 2006).
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in the duty-to-report.194 That circuit has remanded a case for further
fact-finding to determine whether a female police officer was speaking
pursuant to her official duties when she submitted a memo to the town
attorney detailing “perceived slights” and potentially harassing
conduct by other officers.195
Other circuits’ interpretations of Garcetti demonstrate why an
overly broad reading of Mills, which encompasses all job-related
statements, is inappropriate. The majority of these circuits have only
read Garcetti’s bar to apply in one or a combination of two
circumstances: 1) where the speech is compelled or required by an
employment duty, and 2) usually where the speech is forwarded using
a medium controlled by the employer; whether it be a log book, an
internal grievance procedure, or a reporting dichotomy. In light of
these decisions, a broad application of Mills likely misapplies the
Supreme’s Court decision and creates bad precedent and as such, the
Seventh Circuit should re-visit and clarify its holding in Mills.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Implications for government employees
Because the Mills opinion did not expressly hold that Sergeant
Mills was speaking pursuant to an official duty solely because she was
on duty and in uniform, government employees in the Seventh Circuit
may argue that Mills should be limited to its facts, and that Mills can
only be supported on two logical bases: 1) because Mills was required
to attend the Chief’s meeting, or 2) because Mills was the type of
high-ranking official whose employment responsibilities include
supporting, without questioning, the official stance of her employer.
Public employees may further argue that a broader reading of Mills is

194

Campbell v. Galloway, No. 06-1038, 2007 WL 1166101 (4th Cir. Apr. 20,

2007).
195

Id. at *1.
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inconsistent with the facts and reasoning of Garcetti, and with the
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence leading to Garcetti.
But even in light of the broad application that Mills suggests, the
Seventh Circuits decision, arguably, will not greatly affect lower level
whistleblowers whose job descriptions do not include a duty-to-report.
In addition, employees would seem to maintain protection from
retaliation for statements made at the workplace which are not part of
a delegated task and do not pertain to the subject matter of
employment—for example, an employee’s expression of unpopular
political ideas in the lunchroom.196 It should also be remembered that,
even in light of Garcetti, government employees are still protected for
whistleblowing under Title VII,197 state whistleblower statutes,198 and
other federal statutes.199
B. Implications for government employers
Although Mills assists government employers by allowing them to
dispose of a large variety of claims at the summary judgment stage, its
broad holding can nonetheless work against a government employer
who does not employ sufficient internal mechanisms against
retaliation. As Section III demonstrates, Garcetti has been held to
protect an employee’s complaints outside of the chain of command.
Thus, an employer that does not internally safeguard employees from
retaliatory employment actions creates an incentive for employees to
196

Compare Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1990)) (“Casual chit-chat between
two persons or otherwise confined to a small group . . . is not protected”) (alteration
in original), with Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-88 (1987) (holding First
Amendment protection extended to private statements made by an employee to a coworker regarding the attempted assassination of then President, Ronald Reagan).
197
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-3 (West 2007).
198
See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 415/19 c.1 (West 2007); IND. CODE 36-1-8-8
(West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 230.80 (West 2007).
199
See generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP.
L. (Matther Bender) § 259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp.
Law § 259.04.
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bypass the employer’s internal mechanisms, and to report their
concerns outside of the office, or directly to the public.
Government employers should also employ internal review
processes prior to disciplining or discharging employees in connection
with statements made at the workplace to ensure that they are not left
open to liability under Garcetti. In addition, these employers would be
wise to base their internal procedures on a narrower reading of Mills in
the case that decision is clarified or overruled.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos will likely
continue to spawn debate over what types of employee speech are
encompassed within a government employee’s official duties.
Although the First Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, Garcetti
should be limited to speech required by an employment duty, or
forwarded using a medium controlled by the employer. In addition,
other circuits that have addressed the issue should continue to limit
their holdings to these scenarios, leaving the second stage of Pickering
balancing to protect government employer’s legitimate interest in
limiting disruptive speech. Because other circuits have so limited their
application of Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit should clarify its holding
in Mills and define a method for analysis for determining when
statements are made pursuant to an official duty to provide certainty
for both government employees and employers in the Seventh Circuit.
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